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NATO CONSULTATIONS AS A COMPONENT OF
NATIONAL DECISIONMAKING
By Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.*
I. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
In domestic legal systems procedures exist for taking account of the
interests of others when unilateral decisions affecting them are made.
These procedures take such forms as the granting of injunctive relief and
the requirement for impact statements. International law lacks comparable
mechanisms. If governments consider the effects of their proposed deci-
sions on other countries, they generally do so as a result of relatively
unstructured intergovernmental consultations. The utility of such consulta-
tions has been recognized by decisionmakers of high rank,' and a few
studies of consultative practices in specialized fields have recently ap-
peared.2 The present study examines the practice of prior consultation in
a setting in which one might expect it to thrive, if it ever does: that of a
political-military alliance among states with widely shared values and
with a common (though not necessarily uniform) apprehension about a
possible external threat to those values.
The North Atlantic Alliance's stated purposes include safeguarding the
freedom and democratic heritage of the members through collective self-
defense and promoting stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.8
The concept of political consultation is important enough to the achieve-
ment of these purposes to be woven into the North Atlantic Treaty and
stressed in all major NATO pronouncements on cooperation within the
* Professor of Law and Director of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and
Lee University School of Law.
The research for -this paper was supported by a NATO Research Fellowship. The
paper is a modified part of a larger project on prior consultations, to be published as a
volume in the Procedural Aspects of International Law series.
I See, e.g., International Economic Report Transmitted to the Congress: Message from
President Ford, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 129, 130 (1977); Rogers, U.S. Foreign Policy in
a Technological Age, 64 id., at 198, 200-01 (1971); Maritime Briefings: Hearings Be-
fore the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 158
(1973) (statement of Ronald A. Webb, Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State); United States-Canadian Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
International Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1976) (statement of Richard D. Vine, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs).
2 See Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: The
Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10 CANAD N Y.B. INT'L L. 212 (1972); Sztucki, Inter-
national Consultations and Space Treaties, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPAcE 147 (M. Schwartz ed., 1975).
3 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, preamble, 63 Stat. 2241, TIAS No. 1964, 34
UNTS 243; 43 AJIL Supp. 159. NATO members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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alliance. Every NATO Secretary General has called upon the member
states to conduct timely consultations when they formulate decisions affect-
ing the alliance4 Implicit in these assertions are the notions that a
political alliance must reflect and generate mutual trust, and that the
degree of trust is gauged by the extent to which national decisionmakers
take the interests of other members into account when they act on matters
within the alliance's ambit.
For consultations to be more than courtesy calls, they must be held
before governments make final decisions and must not be mere statements
of unalterable intention. As put by NATO's "three wise men" in 1956,
Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of infor-
mation, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the
NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been
taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the
discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy for-
mation, and before national positions become fixed.5
This study will identify the extent to which the North Atlantic allies have
followed this practice and have made it the law of the alliance.
Insofar as the consultative practice within NATO has engendered ex-
pectations among its decisionmakers that member governments will consult
the others before they make decisions in definable circumstances, the
practice has created legal nonns within the alliance.6 This is so even
when the expectations are not embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty or
some other formal document. In the terms of traditional international law,
a special custom within the alliance is established if the expectations are
firm and are widely shared by the alliance's decisionmakers.
Some decisions by members must be made collectively if they are to
be effective. This was true, for example, of decisions relating to the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, where no individual
'Paul-Henri Spaak and Joseph Luns have been particularly emphatic. See, e.g.,
Spaak, The Political Future of NATO, 7 NATO LETrER, No. 12, at 1, 4-5 (1959);
Luns, Introduction, in TRANSATLANTIC CRIsIs: EVROPE AND A~mRIcA IN THE '70's 9,
12 (J. Godson ed., 1974). The efforts of the first four Secretaries General are outlined
in F. BEER, INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN NATO 30-37 (1969). For the
relevant treaty provisions and collective pronouncements, see section II, infra.
' Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in
NATO (Dec. 13, 1956), in NATO INFO"IATION SERVICE, NATO FACTS AND FIGURES,
App. 5, at 308, 316 (1976). The three were Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halyard
Lange (Norway), and Mr. Lester M. Pearson (Canada), all Foreign Ministers of their
countries.
For the various possible meanings of "consultation" in the alliance, see H. CLEVELAND,
NATO: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 19 (1970).
6 "Decisionmakers" in NATO would include high-level national and international
officials with important NATO responsibilities. In general, these would be the heads
of state, foreign ministers, and NATO permanent representatives of member states,
plus the NATO Secretary General and perhaps a few other top NATO officials. On
the role of national and international decisionmakers in the shaping of international law,
see McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49
AJIL 356, 357-58 (1955).
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state or small group of NATO states could hope to gain much by taking
independent positions. Because there is little incentive to eschew allied
consultation in such cases, the consultations do not normally reflect any
perceived unwritten obligation and are of marginal significance to a norm-
ative study. This discussion will therefore be focused on situations in
which individual allies, or a small coterie of allies, might stand to gain-
at least in the short run-by acting alone. Such cases test the extent of
allied cooperation and make it possible to gauge a political alliance's
capability to influence member governments' conduct through the growth
of procedural legal norms.
In particular, I will examine the role of the alliance as a means for
bringing the interests of the membership into the decisionmaking process
of each member. For example, if the U.S. Government were considering
a decision that could affect the capacity of the alliance to serve its essential
purposes, the question would be whether the United States is expected to
(and does) consult the North Atlantic Council or in some other manner
reaches all the NATO allies, not whether it consults one or a few allies
with which it may have a special relationship.
It is difficult to identify every occasion when there has been give-and-
take discussion before a member government has made a decision. Not
all NATO consultations appear in published or unclassified records. The
North Atlantic Council, the plenary body composed of representatives of
the 15 member states, holds meetings of the permanent representatives
(ambassadors) at least weekly and of the foreign ministers twice a year,
but the proceedings afre not public and the communiqu6s issued after
each ministerial meeting are so general as to reveal little more than the
broad subjects discussed. In addition to the Council meetings, there are
weekly luncheons at NATO headquarters attended by the member states'
permanent representatives, but those discussions are strictly off the record.
Informal, unrecorded NATO consultations also take place outside the
Brussels headquarters, particularly in Washington where diplomats at the
subambassadorial level stay in contact with their counterparts in the mem-
ber countries' embassies. To avoid inaccuracies stemming from the lack of
complete records, the discussion to follow deals only with those instances
for which prior consultation or the lack thereof has been documented or
may reasonably be inferred through published materials, unclassified
NATO documents, or personal interviews.
II. ThE FRAMEWvoRK FOR NATO CONSULTATION
North Atlantic Treaty Provisions
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides, "The Parties will consult
together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."'
The article not only requires the allies to consult when one of them per-
ceives such a threat, but also implies that no party should respond uni-
7North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, Art. 4.
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laterally without first calling for consultation with the others. This im-
plication can reasonably be inferred on a number of grounds: the consul-
tative provision immediately precedes the article contemplating individual,
as well as collective, self-defense in case of an armed attack against any
party; since a unilateral response could endanger all the allies, the con-
sultative provision should be construed broadly in order to enable them
to air their interests before the response is taken; and provisions in the
constituent instrument of a political alliance should be construed, if it is
reasonable in light of their language and context, in a manner most likely
to promote cooperative efforts.
The treaty's only other consultative provision requires the parties to
consult together, if any one of them so requests, for the purpose of review-
ing the treaty after it has been in force for 10 years or more. This implies
that no party may denounce the treaty or radically alter its commitments
under it-moves that would have obvious effects on the security interests
of every party-without consulting the other allies. In other words, this
provision qualifies the implied right of withdrawal that is generally thought
to emanate from a political alliance.8
In practice, the consultation issue has arisen in a variety of situations
that do not involve immediate threats to the territorial integrity of mem-
ber states or full-scale denunciations of the treaty. One question, to which
I shall return later, is whether the practice establishes broader norms of
which those treaty provisions are specific applications.
Recommendations and Declarations
When NATO's three wise men considered the role of consultations in
fostering political cooperation within the alliance in 1956, they recom-
mended (inter alia):
a member government should not, without adequate advance consul-
tation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on
matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members,
unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and
demonstrably impossible;
in developing their national policies, members should take into con-
sideration the interest and views of other governments, particularly
those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation,
even where no community of views or consensus has been reached
in the Council;
where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the
formation of national policies."
The provision appears in id., Art. 12. A right of withdrawal, implied by the nature
of a treaty, is recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 56(1)
(b), UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969). On its
applicability to political alliances, see Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties: Second Report,
[1957] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 16, 38-39; T. ELIAs, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATrES
106 (1974); compare Report of the Int'l L. Comm'n. on the work of its 18th session,
[1966] 2 Y.B. INTL L. CoM.nM'N. 172, 251, 61 AJIL 417 (1967).
1) Report of the Committee of Three, supra note 5, at 318-19. The report drew in
part on a 1951 report of another three-person NATO committee.
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In addition, the wise men called for "NATO consultation whenever eco-
nomic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved, particularly
those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic
health of the Atlantic Community as a whole." '1 The North Atlantic
Council formally approved these recommendations.,,
In 1967, after reviewing a series of studies on the future of the alliance,
the Council stated that
[a]s sovereign states the Allies are not obligated to subordinate their
policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum
and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus,
each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the
problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of
rank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved.12
The Council also made the following highly equivocal statement: "In
accordance with established usage the Allies, or such of them as wish to
do so, will also continue to consult on [problems arising outside the North
Atlantic Treaty area] without commitment and as the case may demand." "I
In 1974 the NATO heads of government agreed to the Declaration on
Atlantic Relations. During the previous year, Secretary of State Kissinger's
tumultuous "Year of Europe," attempts to define the principles of trans-
atlantic cooperation had created more discord than harmony. The consul-
tation issue was particularly troublesome. In the end, the declaration had
this to say:
The Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims
requires the maintenance of close consultation, co-operation and mu-
tual trust, thus fostering the conditions necessary for defence and
favourable for d6tente, which are complementary. In the spirit of
the friendship, equality and solidarity which characterize their rela-
tionship, they are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed
and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by
all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their com-
mon interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these
interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world. They
wish also to ensure that their essential security relationship is sup-
ported by harmonious political and economic relations. In particular
they will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic
policies and to encourage economic co-operation with one another. 4
The clear purport of the 1956, 1967, and 1974 pronouncements is that
allied consultation should be informative and should precede important
decisions, though it is not clear which decisions would be of the requisite
magnitude. The assertion that consultation should precede decision was
10 Id. at 323.
11 Resolution on the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-military Co-operation
in NATO (Dec. 13, 1956), in id., Ann. II, at 335.
12 The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council (Harmel Report, Dec. 14,
1967), in NATO FACTS AND FGmuEs, supra note 5, App. 6, at 336, 337.
13 Id. at 339.
"IDeclaration on Atlantic Relations, June 26, 1974, para. 11, in id., App. 7, at 340,
342, and in 71 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 42, 44 (1974).
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made explicit in the wise men's report and was retained in shorthand
form in the references to "frank and timely consultations" of the later state-
ments. The 1956 and 1967 pronouncements, however, left unclear whether
the allies expected to be consulted about problems outside, as well as
within, the North Atlantic Treaty area. The 1974 declaration is less equiv-
ocal on that point: it notes that the allies' common interests can be affected
by events in other areas of the world. Thus, even though the circum-
stances in which common interests would be affected are not defined, the
1974 declaration shows that expectations of prior consultation may arise
even as to events outside Europe and North America.
Do these pronouncements create a legal obligation to consult when
"common interests" would be affected? The leading study on the legal
effect of North Atlantic Council decisions observed: "To the extent that
a resolution purported to impose an obligation, member states in prin-
ciple have acted as if they were bound by reason of their concurrence."
The study concluded that
even if one takes the view that the NATO Council . . . is nothing
more than a conference of member states and has no power to make
authoritative decisions, there can be no question . . . that certain
resolutions agreed upon unanimously by the national representatives
in the Council would constitute international agreements creating
international obligations for the member states.'5
That would be so, a fortiori, when the heads of government issue a decla-
ration. But none of the three major pronouncements on consultations was
couched in clearly obligatory terms, and all are rather vague as to just
what types of decision call for consultation.16 Even the 1974 declaration
said only that the parties "are firmly resolved" to strengthen the "practice"
of prior consultation. That language suggests that the existing practice
had not been extensive or consistent enough to establish a norm for prior
consultation on all matters of common interest to the alliance; certainly,
the words "firm resolve" do not convey an intent to create a binding norm
then and there.
In fact, the declaration deliberately fell short of a normative assertion,
but only because the French Government would not have joined in it if
it had stated the principle of prior consultation in clearly obligatory
terms. After the declaration was signed, Secretary of State Kissinger told
the press that the problem was whether the consultative principle "was
intended to be a legal obligation or a practice reflecting the spirit of the
15 Stein & Carreau, Law and Peaceful Change in a Subsystem: "Withdrawar" of France
from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 62 AJIL 577, 608, 613 (1968) (emphasis
in the original).
16 In addition to the 1956, 1967, and 1974 pronouncements, the North Atlantic
Council has endorsed the principle of intensified consultations on several occasions.
See, e.g., the Council's communiqu6s of May 10, 1961, para. 10, in NATO, TEXTs OF
FINAL COMMUNIQuiS 1949-1974, at 136, 137-38 (1975); Dec. 15, 1962, para. 7, in
id. at 147, 148; May 24, 1963, para. 7, in id. at 150, 151. Nonmandatory language
was used.
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alliance." 17 He also said that it had always been the American view that
a declaration does not represent a set of legal obligations, but this appears
to have been partly another bow to French antipathy and partly an ex-
pression of the Austinian notion that there can be no truly "legal" obliga-
tion without the means to compel compliance.18 At the same news con-
ference, Secretary Kissinger described U.S. intentions in terms that very
nearly promised consultation: "As the country which has the most interests
outside of the treaty area of any of our allies, we will meticulously imple-
ment the principle of consultation. . . ." He added that although emergen-
cies might arise in which the United States would have to act without
consulting the allies, "in all situations which are not emergency situations,
the United States feels an obligation to concert its general policies with
those of its allies.""' NATO officials viewed the declaration as a commit-
ment,20 though it is not clear whether they considered it a legal commit-
ment in the sense that a failure to consult would violate an obligatory
norm of the Organization. Nor is it clear whether they thought it applied
to all matters of common interest to the alliance. Perhaps the declaration
might best be put in the "twilight zone" between formally binding instru-
ments and those of no legal significance.21
Several Presidents of the United States have affirmed their intention
to consult the NATO allies on decisions of particular interest to them. For
example, when General de Gaulle proposed that France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States form a tripartite "directorate" for closer
political coordination, President Eisenhower replied, "We cannot afford
to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or other free
world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own
vital interests are being made without their participation." 22 This state-
ment is significant because of its context. The President declined a tempt-
ing opportunity to limit consultations on important matters to those allies
having the most to contribute, in favor of a continuing commitment to
the more cumbersome process of NATO consultations. Although the
President did not use the language of legal obligation, the necessary in-
ference from what he said-that basic decisions affecting the allies' vital
interests would not be made without their participation-must have created
17 Kissinger news conference, 71 DEP'T STATE BOLL. 37, 39 (1974).
1s Kissinger's disclaimer regarding the legal effect of a declaration is in id. at 37. The
French position is reported in Atlantic News, June 19, 1974, at 1, and June 20, 1974,
at 2. See also the remarks of U.S. Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, in 71 DEP'r STATE
BuLL. 171, 172 (1974) ("consultation should not be viewed as a legally binding ob-
ligation"), and of Kissinger in id. at 629, 632 ("you can't wave a paper at somebody
and tell him he's obliged to consult if he doesn't want to consult").
19 Id. at 37, 38.
20 See Neff, NATO Political Consultation: Fact or Myth?, 23 NATO REv., No. 1, at
7 (1975).
21 Compare Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agree-
ments, 71 AJIL 296 (1977).
22 The Atlantic Alliance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security and
International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 7, at 230 (1966).
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expectations that the United States, at least, would act accordingly. That
kind of expectation, if reinforced in practice and through affirmation over
time by the appropriate decisionmakers, can create a norm having the
force of law, even though-as in most situations involving international
law-unwilling governments cannot be coerced into compliance.
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all reaffirmed the American intention
to consult. President Nixon, on his 36th day in office, pledged to the
North Atlantic Council that there would be full and genuine consultations
before and during U.S. arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union,
and added:
Beyond consulting on those negotiations, and beyond consulting
on other policies that directly affect the NATO nations themselves,
I intend to consult on a broad range of other matters. I shall not only
welcome but actively seek the counsel of America's NATO partners
on the questions that may affect the peace and stability of the world,
whatever the part of the world in which they arise.
23
President Ford, in an address to the Council, called for improving the
process of political consultation and concluded, "We should further culti-
vate the habit of discussing our approaches to those matters which touch
the interests of all so that we can develop common policies to deal with
common problems." 24 President Carter, in the same forum, said, "We
have set an excellent record of consulting with one another on a wide
range of issues. That can and should continue, and the United States will
increasingly draw the NATO allies into its counsels."25
These declarations and statements all assert or imply that consultations
will precede decisionmaking, and will not be limited to decisions regarding
events within the North Atlantic geographic area. They would raise ex-
pectations that the allies would be consulted before decisions affecting
their vital interests are made, at least to the extent that actual practice
defines both the decisions and allied interests sufficiently to guide those re-
sponsible either for conducting consultations or for evaluating the ade-
quacy of others' consultations. To this the discussion now turns.
III. ACTION WrIHm THE ALLIANCE AFFECTING NATO DEFENSES IN EUROPE:
Decisions to Limit Military Commitments
If there are obligatory norms for consultation not stemming directly
from provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty, one would expect them to
be most evident when significant changes in military commitments to the
alliance are at stake. That is in fact the case.
The NATO allies annually make and revise rolling 5-year defense plans
under a system that involves detailed consultations by each member gov-
ernment in the preparation of its annual defense budget. In its current
form, the rather elaborate process essentially consists of an annual com-
parison between the proposed 5-year defense plans of those allies partici-
23 60 DEPT STATE BuLL. 250, 252 (1969).
2472 id., at 886, 888 (1975). 25 Id., No. 2011, Feb. 1978, at 16.
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pating in the integrated NATO defense system (all member states except
France, Greece, and Iceland) and the force goals approved by the NATO
Defence Planning Committee, which is comprised of representatives of
the same member states. When the proposed defense plan of a member
state falls short of the goals set for it by the Defence Planning Committee,
the NATO staff and representatives of other allied governments attempt
to persuade the member to come closer to the goals. Nevertheless, each
member government retains the final authority to determine the size of
its military budget,26 and the combined NATO 5-year Force Plan emerges
each year as the sum of those national decisions. Each government is
committed to supplying the forces designated in the plan for the first
year only.
27
Although this process has evolved over time, each year since 1952 some
form of review has been held before national defense budgets have been
adopted.28 The allies participating in the integrated defense system do
not consider themselves free to bypass the consultative process. Thus, at
least for the member states that have not opted out of fully integrated
NATO defense, this procedure amounts to a legal duty supported by
consistent practice under the conviction that the practice is required-the
essence of custom in international law.
There have been several occasions when individual member states have
wished to withdraw substantial force commitments from NATO, apart
from the normal fluctuations reflecting annual budget revisions. In 1955
the North Atlantic Council adopted a resolution setting forth the procedure
for such cases. Paragraphs 3, 7, and 8 of the resolution said that the
Council,
RECOGNISING that important quantitative or qualitative changes in
member countries' contributions to NATO defence are of concern to
the Alliance as a whole and that any such change is therefore properly
the subject of multilateral consideration within NATO;
RECOGNISInG also that, while the procedures of the Annual Review
are the normal method adopted in the Alliance for multilateral con-
sideration of national contributions to NATO defence, provision should
be made for circumstances in which a member government feels com-
pelled to make important qualitative or quantitative changes in its
current or prospective force contributions to NATO, at a time of year,
or with a degree of urgency, which render impracticable their con-
sideration under the normal procedure;
AGREES therefore that in the circumstances described above:
(a) The government concerned shall inform the Council and the
appropriate NATO military authorities of the changes contemplated.
This shall be done, whenever possible, in time for the Council's views
26 See L. SLoss, NATO REFORM: PROSPECTS AND PuoITIES 6 (3 The Washington
Papers, 1975).
27 This simplified outline of the military budget consultation procedure is based on
NATO FACTS AND FiGUREs, supra note 5, at 113-15, and on an interview with David
Kyd, head of the NATO Press Service, July 5, 1978.
28 NATO FACTS AND FicurEs, supra note 5, at 112.
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to be fully considered by the government concerned before the execu-
tion of decisions on the matters in question.
(b) If a government feels compelled to withdraw units from the
area of NATO command to which they are assigned or earmarked in
order to meet an emergency elsewhere, it shall at once inform the
appropriate NATO military authorities, and the Council, at the first
possible opportunity. " 9
This resolution uses legislative language that calls upon member states
to consult "before the execution" of pertinent decisions in the absence of
an emergency. It would create a legal obligation, unless the parties' prac-
tice demonstrated that they do not so view it.30
At various times the United States, France, Canada, Greece, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Italy have reduced their NATO military
commitments in ways that would arguably fall within the compass of the
Council resolution. Because the French and Greek reductions were special
cases, they will be examined after the others.
In the spring of 1966, the United States withdrew 30,000 trained troops
from Europe for use in Vietnam and replaced them with 15,000 inexperi-
enced troops. It promised to supply the remaining 15,000 replacements
by the end of the year. There appears to have been no prior consultation.:1
One could argue, however, that the temporary nature of the reduction in
strength removed the incident from the resolution's purview, or that the
situation in Vietnam amounted to an emergency and thus merely entailed
prompt notification. Consequently, this was not a clear case of failure to
comply with the consultative procedure.
Another indeterminate case occurred in 1967, when a coordinated effort
by the United States and the United Kingdom to reduce the foreign ex-
change costs of stationing forces in West Germany resulted in the removal
of 33,000 troops and four air squadrons to the United States and of 5,000
troops to the United Kingdom. All of the troops and equipment remained
committed to NATO. Consultations were held with the West German
Government and apparently with some other allies before the decisions
were made, but the discussions within NATO itself-which were held
before the removals-seem essentially to have consisted of efforts by the
United States and the United Kingdom to convince the allies to acquiesce.1
2
Since technically there was no change in the American and British force
contributions to NATO, the consultative procedure arguably did not apply.
One could also argue that even if it had applied, the United States and
the United Kingdom had complied with it by discussing the matter within
NATO before removing the troops and equipment. But it is conceivable
.' North Atlantic Council Resolution on Important Changes in National Defence
Efforts, Oct. 5, 1955, paras. 3, 7, 8, NATO Doe. C-M(55)82(Final) (unclassified).
The consultations are actually conducted by NATO's Defence Planning Committee.
3, On the legal effect of "legislative" Council resolutions, see text at note 15, supra.
31 See Senate Hearings, supra note 22, pt. 1, at 26; pt. 4, at 146, 147; pt. 6, at 194
(1966).
31- See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 113-16; 16 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARcHIvEs
22176-77 (1967).
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that the decisions involved "important qualitative changes" in force contri-
butions, which would have brought the consultative procedure into play;
if so, the presentations to the allies would not have satisfied its require-
ments unless there was also some realistic chance that the final decisions-
or at least the manner in which they were to be executed-could have
been affected by the allies' responses.
When the United States later contemplated a troop reduction that
clearly would have entailed the consultative procedure, it did discuss the
matter with its NATO allies. In 1970-1971, the Nixon administration
considered reducing U.S. troop strength in Europe, conducted a study,
consulted within NATO, and finally decided against any troop cuts.'3
The Canadian Government carried out a comprehensive defense review
in the spring of 1969. By early April it had decided to remain within
the integrated military command but to conduct a phased reduction of
Canadian forces in Europe. In announcing its intentions, the Government
expressly recognized an obligation to follow the NATO consultative pro-
cedure in determining the magnitude of the reduction .and details con-
cerning it, but rejected any duty to consult regarding the basic decision
to reduce the forces. 34 When some of the allies suspected that Canada
might not follow the procedure exactly, they objected; the Canadian
Government reiterated its intention to comply, though it insisted that the
initial decision to reduce forces was not subject to the procedure.36
Clearly, Canada acquiesced in a legal duty to consult the allies regarding
execution of the basic decision.
A similar defense review was conducted by the British Government in
1974. A decision was reached in December to reduce the portion of
gross national product committed to defense by a total of I percent over
the next 10 years, and a tentative blueprint was drawn up showing how
this would be carried out. It included, among other things, withdrawal
of U.K. regular forces in the Mediterranean from the NATO command.
The British Government stated its intention to consult the NATO allies
before making its final decisions.36 In the end, some changes were made in
response to the consultations, though they were not of major significance.
The British Defence White Paper on the cutbacks reveals the scope and
effect of the consultations:
During our consultations with our NATO Allies they have asked
us to reconsider those features of the reductions which they consider
most damaging and to study the possibility of undertaking certain
compensatory measures. We have undertaken to study such mea-
33 See Yochelson, The American Military Presence in Europe: Current Debate in the
United States, 15 ORBis 784, 788 (1971); Kohl, The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy
System and U.S.-European Relations: Patterns of Policy-Making, 28 WORLD POLInCS 1,
27-30 (1975).
34See 7 CANADIAN P.AL. DEB., H. C., 28th ParI., 1st Sess. 7724, 7905-06 (1969);
9 id. at 9306.
3s Id. at 9327, 9382.




sures on the clear understanding that all of Britain's defence commit-
ments and capabilities must be met from within the total of resources
which the Government decided last December it could in future
allocate to defence. 3
7
In December 1976 the United Kingdom announced another substantial
reduction in planned defense expenditures, amounting to about £230
million. Again, consultations were held before the final decision, but
without any prospect of inducing a reconsideration of the size of the net
reduction.
3S
In May 1974 the Netherlands proposed a large reduction in its military
manpower assigned to NATO. The Government then submitted its pro-
posal for consultation in accordance with the established procedure and
modified some aspects in response to allied criticisms. Nevertheless, the
final reduction was quite substantial." When the Dutch Government in
August 1975 proposed another reduction, this time affecting only its naval
forces and equipment, further NATO consultations were held. The allies
asked the Dutch Government to reconsider, but its final decision remained
unchanged.4
°
Italy devised a plan to reduce its armed forces by 20 percent in early
1976, and initiated NATO consultations. Because the reduction would ac-
tually increase the efficiency of the Italian armed services, the NATO allies
contented themselves with a token statement of concern. No change was
made in the Italian plan .4
The French measures of March 1966 were of a magnitude quite different
from those discussed above. Without prior consultation, General de Gaulle
announced that France was going to withdraw all its army and air forces
then under NATO command 42 and demand that NATO military head-
quarters and individual allied military installations be removed from French
territory.43 The French notes to the allied governments expressly rejected
negotiations over anything other than problems caused by the decision. 44
37 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, Cmnd. No. 5976, at 13 (1975).
39 See Atlantic News, Sept. 21, 1977, at 1-2.
39 See id., July 10, 1974, at 1-2. The Dutch NATO commitment was reduced by
20,000 men.
41 NATO Press Release (75) 16, Sept. 26, 1975; interview with David Kyd, head
of the NATO Press Service, July 7, 1978.
41 Interview with David Kyd, supra note 27; see also 26 NATO REV., No. 1, at 17
(1978).
' French naval forces had already been withdrawn.
43 Individual allies could have kept their military facilities in France if they had
agreed to place them under French operational control.
44 See, e.g., the French aide-m~moire to Canada, in 3 CANADIAN PARL. DEB., H. C.,
27th Parl., 1st Sess. 2917-18 (1966); French aide-m6moire to the United States, 54
DEP'T STATE BULL. 617-18 (1966), and the U.S. response, id. at 617. See also the
statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, id. at 695.
The French did not ask NATO to remove its political headquarters, though the allies
ultimately decided that the civilian headquarters should follow the military to Belgium.
France did continue to participate not only in NATO political activities, but in some
defense matters. See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 102-03.
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Not only did France fail to comply with the Council's consultative pro-
cedure, but it arguably breached the implied North Atlantic Treaty ob-
ligation to consult by means of a review conference if it wished radically
to alter its treaty commitment.45
Greece followed the French lead in 1974, though on a much smaller scale.
It withdrew from the NATO integrated military command, but this action
involved little more than the removal of Greek officers from NATO facilities
in Turkey. It also withdrew from the NATO Defence Planning Committee
but kept its representatives in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) and in some other military coordinating bodies. There
was no consultation before the Greek decision.
46
Despite the French and Greek failures to consult, the overall NATO
practice of compliance with the Council's consultative procedure ade-
quately supports it as the law of the Organization. Canada, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Italy demonstrated that they felt obliged
to consult, but by their practice established that the consultations need
not precede a firm decision to reduce forces. They need only precede de-
cisions regarding such matters as the magnitude and timing of the reduc-
tion-"the execution of decisions on the matters in question," to use the
terms of the Council resolution. The one case in which the United States
consulted even as to the basic decision cannot by itself establish a precedent.
The other cases either were borderline as to whether they fit within the
resolution (the 1966 and 1967 cases involving the United States) or in-
volved aberrational conduct (de Gaulle's highly nationalistic decision, of
which only three members of his own cabinet were informed in advance,4
and Greece's decision, which was made virtually overnight in reaction to
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus). The allied responses to the manner in
which France and Greece acted, though diplomatic in tone, clearly did not
acquiesce in the failures to consult. 4s The resolution's normative character
thus seems to have been preserved.
Use or Production of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Another formal NATO consultative procedure can be found in the guide-
lines on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Originally devised
at the 1962 NATO ministerial meeting in Athens and since revised, they
require (subject to a caveat mentioned below) that a member considering
the use of nuclear weapons in Europe consult all member governments.
45 See text at note 8 supra. Stein & Carreau, supra note 15, at 620, 639, conclude that
even if France was entitled to withdraw its military cooperation under the doctrine of
changed circumstances, it had a good faith duty to submit a reorganization proposal to
the Council.
46 Interview with David Kyd, supra note 27; see also R. HILL, POLrICAL CONSULTA-
TION N NATO: PARLLMENTARY AND POLICY AsPEcTs 79 (Canadian Dep't of Nat'l
Defence ORAE Mem. No. M72, 1975).
4 Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 70 REVUE GNai~kALE DE Dnorr
INT'L PUBLIC 736, 760-61 (1966).
48 See the declaration by the 14 NATO allies other than France, stressing the need
to consult and act together, 3 CANADL N PABL. DEB., H. C., 27th Parl., 1st Sess. 2875
(1966). See also the statement by U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball regarding
French unilateralism, 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 613, 616 (1966).
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The latter are to transmit their views through the North Atlantic Council
or the NATO Defence Planning Committee to the government of the
nuclear power, which retains the final decisionmaking authority. The
caveat is that the full procedure need not be used if time and circum-
stances do not permit. It is apparently understood that time and circum-
stances would not permit during either a nuclear or full-scale conventional
attack on Western Europe. But even in those cases, consultation ap-
parently would be required with those NATO states on whose territory
the weapons are based or would fall, and with those providing the nuclear
warheads and/or delivery systems. 5 Consultation with these states has
been called an "obligation" in a report issued by a committee of the Western
European Union." The implication is not that full-scale NATO consulta-
tion is never an obligation; rather, in extreme circumstances the obligation
is qualified by the need to act quickly-but the governments primarily in-
volved must still be consulted.
The Athens guidelines concern the use of nuclear weapons once they
have been deployed in Europe. In the late 1970's the United States con-
sulted its European allies intensively about another nuclear weapons issue:
whether to produce an enhanced radiation warhead, or "neutron weapon." 51
The case, however, was not one in which the United States had a substantial
incentive for making its decision unilaterally, since the warhead was to be
produced primarily for use in Europe. There would have been little point
in producing it without some assurances from the European states that they
would ultimately allow it to be deployed on their territories.
Appointment of SACEUR
There is greater normative significance in the U.S. practice of consulting
the NATO allies before appointing a new Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR). Although it would be shortsighted not to consult
fully, the importance of the position to the United States and its practical
ability to place its preferred designee in the job could induce it to hold
only pro forma consultations. It appears, however, that the U.S. Govern-
ment has taken the consultations seriously.1
2
41 See STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93D CONG., IST SESS., U.S.
SECURTY ISSUES IN EUROPE: BURDEN SHARING AND OFFSET, MBFR AND NucLEAR
WEAPONS 19-20 (Comm. Print 1973); Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad and the
Subcomm. on Arm Control, Internat'l Law and Organization of the Sen. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 156-57 (1974) (statement of Secretary of De-
fense James R. Schlesinger); COMm. ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS OF THEs
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ASSEMBLY, COMMUNICATIONS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN
THE ALLIANCE 20 (1977).
ru Report of the COMM. ON DEFENCE QUEsTIONS AND ARmA.MENTS, supra note 49.
51 The enhanced radiation warhead would kill enemy troops without causing extensive
damage to inanimate objects. On the NATO consultations, see Atlantic News, Sept. 28,
1977, at 4; id,, Oct. 14, 1977, at 1; id., Dec. 10, 1977, at 2; id., Mar. 22, 1978, at 4; id.,
Mar. 24, 1978, at 1.
-'U.S. consultations appear in H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 128; N.Y. Times, Sept.
6, 1974, at 1, col. 5; id., Mar. 1, 1979, at A13, col. 6.
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Disputes Among Member States
On a few well-known occasions, a NATO member state has attempted
to resolve a dispute with another member by using force or taking other
actions that would adversely affect the other member's military capability
in the European area. The issue is not whether there are prior consulta-
tions between the disputants in such cases, but whether there are prior
consultations within NATO in order to bring the interests of the alliance as
a whole into the decisionmaking process.
The most notorious nonamicable attempts to resolve disputes were the
Anglo-Icelandic "cod wars" and the Cyprus hostilities between Greece and
Turkey. The first cod war took place in 1958, when Iceland extended its
exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles. The extension cut heavily into
long-established British fishing interests off the coasts of Iceland. Just be-
fore the decree's effective date of September 1, fishery experts of the NATO
states (including Iceland and the United Kingdom) met to try to find a solu-
tion. When no solution was reached, Iceland put the new zone into effect
and the British Government promptly sent in destroyers to protect the
British trawlers. Although there is no public record of what was said at
the NATO meeting, it is reasonable to assume not only that Iceland dis-
cussed its plans to go ahead as scheduled, but also that the United Kingdom
revealed its proposed response.53
Iceland again extended its exclusive fishery zone (to 50 miles) on
September 1, 1972, but the United Kingdom refrained from sending in
destroyers until May 1973, after incidents had occurred between the Ice-
landic Coast Guard and British trawlers. The British Government did not
consult its NATO allies before acting. It simply told the North Atlantic
Council what it was doing.5'
In July 1974 a faction of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, supported by
the military junta in Greece, ousted Archbishop Makarios as President of
Cyprus and installed a firm advocate of union with Greece. Five days later
Turkey invaded Cyprus and set up a Turkish Cypriot administration in
northern Cyprus. Turkey later widened its area of control. Although
high-level representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom
were in urgent telephone and personal contact with their Turkish and Greek
counterparts during the 5 days before the original Turkish invasion, there
is no indication that the Turks and Greeks felt obliged to consult anyone."
53 See 11 KIasnc's CoN-=mponARY ARtCzIE 16479 (1958). The British Govern-
ment had already warned that it would send in destroyers if necessary.
,4See 19 id. at 26028, 26030 (1973); Atlantic News, May 23, 1973, at 1.
55 See Stern, Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus, FonmnN PoxicY, No. 19, at
34, 62--64 (1975); Rudnick, NATO and the Cyprus Crisis, TaE ROUND TABLE, No. 266,
at 182, 187 (1977). For a report of postinvasion NATO consultations, see R. HILL,
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS IN NATO 27 (6 Wellesley Papers 1978).
When Turkey sent the Sismick I into the Aegean Sea for geologic soundings in July
1976, serious tension with Greece again resulted. There were no North Atlantic Council
consultations because the matter was considered essentially a bilateral affair. Atlantic
News, July 20, 1976, at 3.
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Rather, the contacts amounted to last-minute peacekeeping efforts by two
vitally concerned allies, and in any event they did not encompass the alli-
ance as a whole.
When measures adversely affecting an ally's military capabilities have
fallen short of open hostilities, there have sometimes been consultations
within the alliance. For example, after the Icelandic elections in 1971, the
new Government announced that it would invoke the consultative pro-
cedure in the 1951 agreement with the United States with a view to pos-
sible termination of their mutual defense arrangement. Under the pro-
cedure Iceland could have closed the U.S. air base at Keflavik-which it
threatened to do-after allowing 6 months for consultations within the
North Atlantic Council; failing agreement, either government may give
12 months notice of termination, which would allow an opportunity for
readjustment.- Council consultations were held, and a settlement per-
mitting continued U.S. operation of the base was reached in 1974 (follow-
ing a change of government in Iceland). 57
A similar situation occurred in Portugal, which at one time considered
closing U.S. air bases in the Azores. The Portuguese Government discussed
the matter with the United States, and apparently in the North Atlantic
Council."
After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the U.S. Congress legislated
an embargo on arms transfers to Turkey. The legislation was discussed in
the North Atlantic Council before it went into force, but not with much
hope of influencing the outcome.59 Later, when the House of Representa-
tives rejected a proposal for a partial lifting of the embargo, Turkey re-
taliated by closing American bases. The NATO allies were advised be-
forehand of the Turkish threat to close the bases, but the decision to do so
apparently was not discussed in the Council until after it had been made.6'
Nevertheless, the element of retaliation sets this case apart.
56 See Defense Agreement with Iceland Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, May 5,
1951, Art. 7, 2 UST 1195, TIAS No. 2266, 205 UNTS 173.
57 See Bjarnason, Iceland's Position in NATO, 15 ATLANTIC ComInmuNrrY Q. 393,
400-01 (1977).
' 35 Facts on File 387 (1975) refers to Portuguese willingness to resume talks with
the United States on this issue. R. HiL, supra note 55, at 95, poses the North Atlantic
Council discussion hypothetically. The author, however, was in a position to know
whether the discussion occurred, and presumably stated it hypothetically to avoid
public confirmation of matters not officially on the public record.
',9 Andr6 de Staercke, who was the Belgian permanent representative to NATO at
that time and dean of the NATO ambassadorial corps, characterized the discussion as
notification rather than consultation. Interview with Ambassador de Staercke, July 6,
1978. To the same effect: interview with Peter Collins, political officer in the U.S.
delegation to NATO, July 14, 1978.
61 Interview with Peter Collins, supra note 59; Atlantic News, July 11, 1975, at 3;
id., July 30, 1975, at 1-2.
It will be recalled that the French measures of March 1966 included the closing of
allied military installations. There were no prior consultations. See text at note 43,
supra. That case, however, involved a violation of an explicit procedural norm.
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Not all policy decisions directly affecting an ally's military capability
have involved arms embargoes or the closing of bases. For example, in
the fall of 1962 the United States decided not to proceed with the develop-
ment of Skybolt, a missile the United Kingdom had relied upon to give
new life to its strategic bomber force. Before President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Macmillan formally announced the demise of Skybolt in December
1962 at their summit meeting in the Bahamas, Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara had flown to London to discuss the decision and then attended a
North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting at which the allies undoubtedly
explored the matter.61 Despite assertions to the contrary by Secretary
McNamara and Prime Minister Macmillan, the U.S. decision seems to have
been made before the London and NATO discussions. The only questions
left open had to do with the alternative to Skybolt to be offered the United
Kingdom. 62
Another decision affecting an ally's military capability, though less di-
rectly than in the case of Skybolt, was that of the United States and the
United Kingdom to supply arms to Tunisia during Algeria's war of in-
dependence from France. There was no prior NATO consultation. Since
the arms could well have found their way to Algeria or have freed other
weapons for that purpose, the Anglo-American decision precipitated a minor
NATO crisis. France charged that the two allies had violated the con-
sultative principles set forth by the three wise men in 1956.03
The occasional instances of Council consultation are not sufficient to
establish a duty to consult the allies before taking an action that weakens
the ability of another ally to participate in the common defense. Measures
of this sort are to be distinguished from those that directly weaken the
alliance as a body. In such cases, which usually involve troop reductions or
military budget cuts, consultations before final decisions are the norm.
IV. DL-nENTE wrnm EASTERN EUROPE AND THE GERMAN QUESTION
Arms Control Negotiations
Post-World War II arms control negotiations began in earnest in the
early 1960's and have continued in various forms ever since. With a few
exceptions, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks, these negotiations
have not involved formally coordinated NATO positions. Instead, one or
a few member states have carried on negotiations with the Eastern bloc,
61 See The Times (London), Dec. 8, 1962, at 8, col. 3; id., Dec, 14, 1962, at 8, col. 4
and 12, col. 1. The Final Communiqu6 of the North Atlantic Council ministerial ses-
sion, Dec. 15, 1962, note 16 supra, at 147, 148 (1975), refers to a discussion of adequate
and balanced forces, nuclear and conventional, and to a need for closer alignment
between NATO military requirements and national force plans.
62 See H. ThmwHnTr, McNAmArAP, 175 (1971).
63 See F. BEER, supra note 4, at 16; M. BALL, NATO AND Tr= EURoPEAN MOVEMENT
140 (1959); G. LissiA, NATIONS IN ALLIANcE: Thi Lrmrrs OF INTMERPENDENCE 79
(1962). For the wise men's recommendations on consultation, see text at note 9, supra.
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or in a few cases, such as the seabed arms control negotiations, all NATO
states have been free to participate without any commitment to present a
united front. Whenever there is no commitment to coordinate among all
NATO members, the issue of prior consultation tends to arise between the
negotiating and the nonparticipating members.
64
In most cases the United States has been either the leading or the sole
negotiator from the alliance. A number of instances can be found in
which high-ranking U.S. officials have said that their Government consults
within NATO before presenting a new position in arms control negotiations,
or have pledged that it will do so.65 But the record suggests that the U.S.
"consultations" are sometimes mere notifications or briefings.
One of the first examples involved the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963."6
At most, the United States informed several of its major European allies of
the treaty's details just before the Moscow signing. The Assembly of the
Western European Union adopted a resolution regretting "the absence of
sufficient and previous consultations, and [requesting] that in the future
the conclusion of treaties affecting the vital interests of member States of
NATO and WEU be preceded by consultations in the spirit of the trea-
ties."6' This very nearly amounted to an assertion of the duty to consult,
and the United States within a few years began acknowledging its intention
to do so.
The European allies were not vitally interested in some of the other arms
control negotiations of about the same vintage. These included the negoti-
ations leading to the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, both of




On the other hand, the European allies were quite interested in the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. After the negotiations had dragged on for
some time, the United States-Soviet talks suddenly became serious in late
1966. Without consulting its NATO allies, the United States worked out
with the Soviet Union the arrangement that eventually became the core
"4 As I noted at the beginning of this article, efforts such as CSCE and MBFR that
require detailed coordination to be effective are not particularly significant to a norma-
tive study of prior consultations. Consequently, they are mentioned only briefly in this
section.
6 See Secretary of State Dean Rusk's statement in Senate Hearings, supra note 22,
pt. 5, at 161 (1966); H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 70 (reporting President Nixon's
pledge to consult) and at 177; statement by President Carter, DEP'T STATE BULL.,
No. 2014, May 1978, at 31.
66 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 UST 1313, TIAS No. 5433, 480 UNTS 43.
67 See Report of the Comm. on Defence Questions and Armaments, The Moscow
Test Ban Treaty and Its Effects on the Western Alliance, Assembly of the Western
European Union Doc. 288, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH ORDINARY SEssIoN, pt. 2, vol.
3, at 79, 88 (1963).
68ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, COLLECTED TExTs ADOPTED AND
REPLIES OF THE COUNCIL,, 9th Ordinary Sess., at 15 (1963).
69 See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 67.
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of the treaty.70 It involved a promise by nuclear weapons states not to
transfer nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states or assist them in their manu-
facture, and a promise by the latter not to receive or manufacture nuclear
weapons. This meant, of course, that the North Atlantic Alliance would be
limited to three nuclear powers, at least if those three all became parties
to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The allies let the United States know of
their disenchantment with the failure to consult. The result was close
consultation in the North Atlantic Council from April 1967 until the drafting
was completed and the treaty signed on July 1, 1968.71
A similar scenario unfolded in the fall of 1967, when the U.S. Govern-
ment was considering its options regarding development and deployment of
antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. Without consulting the NATO allies,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that the United States
had decided to go ahead with a "thin" ABM system to defend against a
possible Chinese attack, rather than a more ambitious system capable of
defending against an all-out Soviet attack. Although selection of the
"Chinese option" arguably put the decision outside the area of NATO con-
cern, the NATO allies did not see it that way. At a meeting of the NATO
Nuclear Planning Group a week after Secretary McNamara's announcement,
he was openly challenged for having failed to consult. It was noted that
even a "thin" system could be used against a Soviet attack, and the question
was raised whether the United States planned to protect itself at least
partly from Soviet attack while leaving Europe vulnerable. Secretary Mc-
Namara responded that the ABM issue had not really been decided yet, and
that European views would be taken into account before the decision was
made.72 As it turned out, the U.S. decision was not final, and the ABM's
fate became tied to the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).
The SALT negotiations are bilateral between the two superpowers.
They began in 1968, near the end of the Johnson administration, and have
resulted in an interim (SALT I) agreement in May 1972, acceptance of
limits on strategic delivery vehicles in 1974, and, since then, a SALT If
agreement in 1979 and SALT III negotiations. Throughout, the United
States has been in frequent contact with its NATO allies regarding the
negotiations. These contacts have been cited by a former NATO Secretary
General as examples of trustful and complete consultations, an assessment
shared by the former dean of the NATO corps of permanent representa-
70 Id. at 68, noting that the allies were only brought up to date several weeks later.
71 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483,
TIAS No. 6839, 729 UNTS 161. On the consultations, see H. CLEVELAND, supra
note 5, at 68-69; F. BEF, supra note 4, at 24-25; Lyon, Beyond NATO?, 24 INT'L J.
(Canada) 268, 271 (1974).
E. GOODmAN, THE FATE OF TrE ATLANnc CoMMUNITY 383 (1975), says that the
"allied consultation was in the nature of a tardy effort to make amends for oversights
in a deal originally struck by the superpowers." But, given the forceful objections by
the allies after they had been bypassed in 1966, this is tantamount to saying that the
United States was acquiescing in an assertion by the allies of a right to be consulted.
Customary international law is created by just such a process.
72 See H. CLEvELAND, supra note 5, at 59; J. NEWHOOSE, COLD DAWN: TiE STony
OF SALT 96-99 (1973).
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tives. 73 As will be seen, however, not all the European Governments joined
in that assessment-at least as it applies to SALT I.
In January 1969 the U.S. permanent representative briefed the North At-
lantic Council on the outgoing Johnson administration's SALT objectives
and negotiating principles. The briefing took place after the initial Amer-
ican proposal had been prepared, and would have been after it had been
presented to the Soviet Union if the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia had
not led the United States to postpone the first SALT meeting.
74
When the Nixon administration took office, it began to prepare its own
proposals. President Nixon told the Soviet Ambassador that negotiations
could not begin until the review could be completed and consultations could
be held with the allies., During the ensuing 3 years of negotiations lead-
ing to the SALT I agreement, U.S. officials routinely briefed the allies in
Brussels before and after each of the seven negotiating rounds. It appears,
however, that the actual proposals were developed almost entirely within
the administration, sometimes without even the participation of the U.S.
arms control bureaucracy. The most crucial negotiations in the spring of 1972
were prepared in total secrecy and then conducted equally secretly by
Secretary of State Kissinger in Moscow while the seventh round was follow-
ing its own course in Helsinki." In the eyes of at least some European
allies, the "consultations" were little more than notifications of what the
United States had already decided to do or had done.77 Nevertheless, the
allies raised no strong objections to the procedure, probably because the
substance of the SALT I agreement did not seriously affect Western
European security and because the regular briefings did provide some as-
surance of that."
Some other bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations at about the same time were
conducted with little or no prior NATO consultation. In 1972 the two
superpowers signed their nonbinding "Basic Principles of Relations," the
forerunner of the Helsinki accords eventually reached in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The "Basic Principles" did not in-
clude some points, important to the West, that were later incorporated in
73Brosio, Consultation and the Atlantic Alliance, 16 SuRvrvAL 115, 117 (1974)
(referring also to the multilateral CSCE and MBFR negotiations); interview with
Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59.
74J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 72, at 120-30, 137-38. The Newhouse book is an in-
sider's account of the SALT I negotiations.
75 Id. at 141.
76 Id. at 176-86, 203, 214-18, 223-24, 234-56.
77 See Smart, Perspectives from Europe, in SALT: THE Moscow AGREEMENTS AND
BEYOND 185, 190 (M. Willrich & J. Rhinelander eds., 1974). Compare J. SCHAE1ZEL,
THE UNHINGED ALLUANCE: AMERICA AND THE EuROPEAN ComMrurNrrY 52 (1975).
71 See Smart, supra note 77; Buchan, The United States and the Security of Europe,
in 8 CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICANS, WESTERN EUROPE: THE TmIALS OF PARTNERSHI
297, 305 (D. Landes ed., 1977). The SALT I agreement was the Interim Agreement
on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with
Protocol, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3462, TIAS No. 7504 (no longer in force).
The initial ABM agreement, negotiated in tandem with SALT I, is the Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 UST 3435, TIAS No.
7503.
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the Helsinki accords, and did include references to "peaceful coexistence"
that were open to Soviet interpretation as legitimating ideological warfare.
The United States did not consult its NATO allies in advance.79 Similarly,
the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War 10 was signed
in 1973 without any meaningful prior NATO consultation. In general, the
agreement commits each party to avoid the threat or use of force against
the other except in self-defense, and provides that if a risk of nuclear con-
flict arises the parties will consult each other and make every effort to
avert the risk. Several commentators have noted that the agreement was
almost certain to raise fears among the NATO allies of the United States
about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent to an attack on Western
Europe.81
The record is less clear as to meaningful NATO consultation before Presi-
dent Nixon's visit to Moscow in early July 1974, when two bilateral agree-
ments were signed: a protocol reducing the number of ABM deployment
areas permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty from two to one,82 and an
agreement (which has never entered into force) limiting the strength of
underground nuclear weapons tests. On June 18 and 19, Secretary of State
Kissinger briefed the North Atlantic Council on the President's impending
trip. He assured the Council that no allied interests would be com-
promised. President Nixon then stopped in Brussels on his way to Moscow,
explaining in general terms the objectives of his trip. Nowhere does it ap-
pear, however, that the allies were given the opportunity at either the
Kissinger or the Nixon briefing to contribute to the positions to be adopted
by the United States.8
3
In July 1977 the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union entered into negotiations pointing toward a comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty, to include a ban on underground tests. Although the
negotiations have been discussed in the North Atlantic Council, the discus-
sions-like most relating to U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiations-appear to
have been more in the nature of briefings than real consultations.84
79 See E. GOODMAN, supra note 71, at 389.
80 June 22, 1973, 24 UST 1478, TIAS No. 7654.
81 See E. GOODMAN, supra note 71, at 390; R. HiLL, supra note 55, at 23; Hassner,
How Troubled a Partnership, 24 INr'L J. (Canada) 166, 178 (1974). Shortly before
the agreement was signed, Henry Kissinger said that when the interests of the European
allies were directly affected by U.S. bilateral negotiations with other superpowers, the
United States had been scrupulously consulting them. Kissinger, The Year of Europe,
68 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 593, 597 (1973). His definition of consultation, however, did
not always coincide with that of the European allies.
82 Protocol to the Treaty of May 26, 1972, on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, July 3, 1974, 27 UST 1645, TIAS No. 8276.
83 The Kissinger-Nixon briefings are reported in Atlantic News, June 18, 1974, at 3;
id., June 20, 1974, at 1; id., June 21, 1974, at 1; id., June 26, 1974, at 1; id., June 27,
1974, at 2. The Moscow visit involved broad strategic arms limitation discussions as
well as the signing of the two agreements.
84 Interview with Stephen J. Ledogar, director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-
Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Aug. 2, 1978.
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All the U.S.-Soviet negotiations mentioned to this point have had po-
tential, but indirect effects on Western Europe. The SALT II and III
negotiations pose issues of much more direct concern to the European
allies. These encompass limitations on forward-based systems (aircraft
and missiles based in Western Europe) and on the deployment of cruise
missiles. As the issues have moved closer to home for the European NATO
members, they have increasingly expected to participate in the U.S. de-
cisionmaking process.8 5 The Carter administration has therefore under-
taken much closer consultations than had occurred during the SALT I and
early SALT II negotiations, thus making it possible for the European allies
to air their views while negotiating positions are being formed.,,
The allies have systematically consulted with one another before taking
positions in a number of multilateral arms control negotiations. In the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations the NATO
allies have presented coordinated positions. The United States has been
tempted to try to settle the MBFR issues bilaterally with the Soviet Union,
but it has consistently referred Soviet proposals to its NATO allies before
taking any position. 7 Similarly, during the negotiations from 1967 until
1971 on seabed arms control, when a NATO member wanted to make a new
proposal it would normally consult the others before putting the proposal
in final form.85 The same held true during the contemporaneous Geneva
negotiations on banning biological weapons.89 Before each session of the
The bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on a proposed agreement prohibiting chemical weapons
have involved some coordination between the United States and those allies represented
at the Geneva disarmament conference, but no political consultations at NATO head-
quarters in Brussels. Ibid.
" See, e.g., Vance, Comment, in THE NEw ATLANTIC CHALLENGE 366, 367 (R. Mayne
ed., 1975). Cf. R. HILL, supra note 55, at 73, reflecting the expectation of a knowledge-
able Canadian official.
Interestingly, when Belgium planned to enter into disarmament talks with Poland, it
consulted its NATO allies first. See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 22.
b6 See Atlantic News, Mar. 23, 1977, at 1; statement of President Carter, DEP'T STATE
BULL., No. 2011, Feb. 1978, at 16, 17, 26 NATO REv., No. 1, at 29 (1978); statement of
George S. Vest, Ass't Secretary of State for European Affairs, in DEP'T STATE BuLL.,
No. 2012, Mar. 1978, at 27, 29. The European insistence on closer consultations, and
U.S. compliance, were brought out also in an interview with Stephen J. Ledogar, supra
note 84.
The Guadeloupe four-power summit in January 1979 was a confirmation of, and a
possible deviation from, the principle of close NATO consultations. It stemmed from
President Carter's inclination to draw into his counsels at an early stage those NATO
allies that would be most acutely affected by the impending SALT III negotiations, but
it excluded all other NATO allies. The departure from pan-NATO consultation was
temporary, as the NATO Nuclear Planning Group was to discuss the SALT III issues in
April.
87 See E. GOODMAN, supra note 71, at 376; R. HILL, supra note 55, at 95.
- See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 73 (giving Canadian practice as an example).
The negotiations produced the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS No. 7337.
8 See Fabiani, Biological Weapons Ban Near After Years of East-West Effort, 20
NATO REV., Nos. 1 & 2, at 20-23 (1972). The negotiations produced the Convention
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Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, the North Atlantic Council has met
to discuss the outstanding issues and the responses of individual allies. 01
In all of these multilateral negotiations, the European NATO allies have
had particular interests to protect. The MBFR negotiations are the most
obvious example, since they deal with East-West force reductions in Central
Europe. The negotiations on seabed arms control and the Law of the Sea
Conference involved defense-related issues of considerable interest to the
NATO maritime states, which includes all except Luxembourg. The nego-
tiations on biological weapons were significant not only because they led
to a ban on the production and use of a specific type of weapon, but also
because they were closely related to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting
gas warfare, to which all NATO states except the United States were al-
ready parties.91
Other Policies Toward Eastern Europe
Some significant policy decisions on relations with potential adversaries
in Eastern Europe have been made outside the context of arms control.
These have included decisions on Berlin and German reunification, steps
toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union by individual NATO mem-
bers, and the development of strategic defense plans by the nuclear powers
in the alliance.
On matters concerning Berlin and the "German question," the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany
have borne special responsibilities. The former three have consistently con-
sulted each other before taking positions and have included Bonn in the
consultations since the West German accession to NATO. The practice of
prior consultations with the other members of the alliance, however, has
not been as consistently observed. They have generally occurred before
relatively formal contacts with the Eastern bloc on specific issues, such as
the sending of a diplomatic note in response to a Soviet initiative or the
signing of an agreement-except when the contacts have been in response
to an immediate crisis. Individual members have generally not held con-
sultations with the entire alliance at each step in the development of their
policies toward Eastern Europe.
To illustrate: During the period of heightening tension over Berlin, be-
fore the serious problems of 1958-1961, the three allied powers responsible
for the city developed the practice of discussing proposed political com-
munications to the Soviet Union with the North Atlantic Council. These
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583,
TIAS No. 8062.
90 See Fabiani, The Caracas Conference on the Law of the Sea, June-August 1974,
22 NATO REV., No. 3, at 22, 23; Atlantic News, Mar. 8, 1978, at 1.
91 See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Cases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 UST 571,
TIAS No. 8061, 94 LNTS 65. The United States became a party at the same time it
ratified the Biological Weapons Treaty.
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appear to have been genuine consultations rather than mere briefings.9 2
Similarly, there were NATO consultations before the 1955 summit and
foreign ministers conferences at which the United States, the United King-
dom, and France met with the Soviet Union to try to resolve the question
of German reunification.93
The Berlin "crises"-an overstatement for the most part-began on
November 27, 1958, when the Soviet Government sent notes to the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany
asserting that the 1944 and 1945 four-power agreements relating to Germany
were void, and that the Soviet Union would give the German Democratic
Republic control over access to Berlin. The foreign ministers of the four
Western allies met just before a North Atlantic Council meeting and agreed
on the issues to be covered in their replies. They issued a statement to that
effect, adding that "[t]hey will consult their allies in the Atlantic Council,
following which the four Governments will formulate their replies ." "
They did so. Another Soviet note was delivered on January 10, 1959. The
four allies cleared their responses with the Council before delivering them
to the Soviet Government." They proposed a conference among the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, to which
the latter eventually agreed. A month before the conference, the allied
negotiating position was discussed extensively in a North Atlantic Council
ministerial meeting. Nevertheless, specific negotiating proposals ap-
parently were adopted just before and during the conference's two sessions
by the three Western participants and the Federal Republic of Germany;
the North Atlantic Council was simply kept apprised of the proceedings. 97
The conference proved inconclusive.
On June 15, 1961, Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that if all states
formerly at war with Germany did not sign a peace treaty by the end of
the year, the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace treaty with East
Germany. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France rejected
this position in notes delivered to the Soviet Union on July 17, after they
had obtained the approval of the North Atlantic Council9 8 On August 13,
the true crisis materialized when the East German authorities sealed the
border between East and West Berlin. The Berlin wall soon followed. At
the height of the crisis the three Western allies apparently acted without
consulting the others (except, eventually, West Germany), although they
did keep them informed. Their actions included the delivery of protest
notes to the Soviet Union, the call-up of more than 75,000 U.S. reservists,
and the dispatch of 1,500 U.S. troops in armored trucks to the autobaln to
West Berlin."" These measures required a series of prompt decisions that
'. See Luns, Progress Report on NATO, 6 NATO LErrFR, No. 12, at 3, 8 (1958);
P.-H. SPAAK, WHY NATO? 35 (1959).
!
3 See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 17. 947 NATO LEarrER, No. 1, at 11 (1959).
V.Id., No. 3, at 6-7 (1959). 96Id., No. 4, at 13 (1959).
97Id., No. 6, at 15 (1959); id., No. 8, at 9 (1959).
96 See 13 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARcHrvEs 18163, 18223 (1961).
"' These events are recounted, without mention of prior NATO consultations, in id.,
at 18274-75, 18277-78, 18307-10; A. SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS 393-400
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probably could not have been effectively coordinated beyond the inner
circle of allies. Eventually, when the discussions among the four allies
disintegrated, the others were brought in.100 The crisis cooled in October.
Allied handling of relations with Eastern Europe since 1961 has followed
much the same pattern: Council consultations before formal contacts and
foreseeable events important to West European security, but not before
steps in the gradual development of policy or before responses to genuine
crises. For example, before the Federal Republic of Germany concluded
its normalization treaty with the German Democratic Republic in 1972, it
consulted its NATO allies.' 0 ' When the latter Government restricted
foreign access to East Berlin in 1977, the three allies responsible for Berlin
consulted within NATO before sending a written protest to the Soviet
Union.10 2 When the Prime Minister of Turkey planned to go to the Soviet
Union in 1978 to sign a "political document" of good will, he discussed
the matter-though apparently without much give-and-take-in the NATO
summit meeting of May 1978 before any specific language had been
drafted.103 Consultations also have been held on policies to be adopted
when President Tito of Yugoslavia leaves office. 0 4  On the other hand,
there were only minimal consultations in the North Atlantic Council while
the West German Ostpolitik was evolving toward normalization with East
Germany and while some other members were pursuing detente with East-
ern Europe in the 1960's.105 And in the crisis situation sparked by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the United States did not consult
its allies before sending two destroyers into the Black Sea. Some of the
allies questioned the lack of consultation. 0 6
(1965); T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 593-96 (1965). See also A. BUCHAN, CRIsS MANAGE-
MENT 36-39 (The Atlantic Papers, NATO Series, No. 2, 1966).
100 See F. BEER, supra note 4, at 18-19.
101 See the Final Communiqu6s of North Atlantic Council Ministerial sessions, Dec. 10,
1971, and May 31, 1972, in NATO, TEXTs OF FINAL COMMuNiQukS 1949-1974, at 266
and 276 (1975).
102 See Atlantic News, Jan. 12, 1977, at 3.
103 Interviews with Orme Wilson, political affairs counselor, U.S. delegation to NATO,
July 10, 1978, and with Francis J. Seidner, public affairs adviser, Bureau of European
Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Aug. 1, 1978. See also N.Y. Times, May 30, 1978, at Al,
col. 5 (city ed.).
104 See R. HILL, supra note 55, at 127.
105 See H. CLEVELAND , supra note 5, at 133, 136, 140; R. HiLL, supra note 55, at
92-93. Hill notes that the allies did not expect extensive consultations from West
Germany during its Ostpolitik phase.
See also Secretary of State Dean Rusks statement in Senate Hearings, supra note 22,
pt. 5, at 161 (1966), mentioning discussions among the four major allies during the
post-Berlin crisis period, but indicating that the other allies were merely briefed on
them.
The West German Government failed to consult all the allies before deciding to hold
a presidential election in Berlin. See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 22.
100 See H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 20-21. It had been routine for the United
States to send warships through the Dardanelles occasionally, in order to show that the
Black Sea is an international body of water. The State Department wished to say




A final class of cases involving policies toward potential adversaries is
represented by changes in U.S. strategic defense plans. Since NATO de-
fenses rely heavily on the retaliatory capability of the United States on a
global scale, as well as within Europe, significant changes in U.S. strategic
defense policy are of vital interest to the alliance. Nevertheless, when
Secretary of State Dulles announced the massive retaliation policy in
January 1954, the NATO allies had simply been notified-not consulted-
beforehand. 107 In 1962 the Kennedy administration abruptly switched to
a strategy of flexible response. There was little or no consultation with
the NATO allies, who were left confused about the countermeasures the
United States was planning in the event of a Soviet attack on Western
Europe."' The United States apparently decided in 1965 to produce
MIRV's (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles) but did not
inform its NATO allies until just before it made a proposal to the Soviet
Union in March 1967 that the impending arms control talks include offen-
sive systems in addition to antiballistic missiles. 10
In sum, NATO consultative practice regarding Eastern Europe has as-
sumed the following pattern. The European NATO allies have strenuously
asserted that the United States has a duty to consult them before making
decisions on arms control negotiations only when the decisions could di-
rectly and significantly weaken the defense of Western Europe. The
United States has acquiesced in that relatively narrow assertion. Other-
wise, the European allies themselves engage in prior consultations only in
the case of a significant, foreseeable event involving Eastern Europe or
when a specific, rather formal contact with Eastern Europe is contemplated,
and then only if the situation is not a true emergency. 10
V. DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE NoRTH ATLANTIc TREATY AREA
Confrontations
The North Atlantic Alliance was established to defend a relatively well-
defined area encompassing North America and Western Europe. The de-
1.7 Interview with Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59. The United States had already
announced a massive retaliation policy relating to a Soviet attack on Western Europe.
The 1954 announcement applied to a Communist attack anywhere, if the attack could
start a general war.
Secretary Dulles did acknowledge that the United States would consult its NATO
allies if it actually had to retaliate massively. See R. OscooD, LIED WAR 208-13
(1957). This appears to have been a recognition of the U.S. obligation under Article 4
of the North Atlantic Treaty. See text at note 7, supra.
A similar pledge to the NATO allies, relating to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere
in the world, was made by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1962. See
H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 15-16.
108 Staff of Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Basic Issues, in THE ATLANTIc
ALLIANCE 7, 21 (H. Jackson ed., 1967). See also H. CLEVELAND, supra note 5, at 47.
109 See J. NEwlousE, supra note 72, at 91.
11o One form of true emergency central to NATO's raison d'etre-an armed attack on
Western Europe-has not occurred. As was discussed in the text at notes 49-50,
supra, there is a formal NATO consultative procedure for the use of tactical nuclear
weapons in such an emergency.
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fense is directed against a possible attack from Eastern Europe. A working
hypothesis-at least in the early years of NATO-was that events outside
these areas were of little concern to the alliance. Under that hypothesis, a
member would not be expected to consult the others before acting outside
the treaty area, even if a confrontation was involved. In practice, however,
several crosscurrents have often influenced the expectation and likelihood
of prior consultation. These include such factors as the need to act quickly
in a crisis, the likelihood of Soviet military involvement, the prospect of
escalation, the geographic proximity of the events to the treaty area, and
the desire of individual allies to be associated with or dissociated from the
policy of the actifig ally.
In the 1950's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made clear that the
United States, as a nation with worldwide responsibilities, might on oc-
casion have to respond to a crisis outside the treaty area without waiting
to consult its NATO allies. He gave a specific example: the protecti6n of
Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese mainland."' This
principle, at least as it applied to an area half a globe away, does not seem
to have aroused any substantial opposition from the allies.
It was another story, however, when Great Britain and France intervened
militarily after President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal
Company in 1956. They acted without consulting their NATO allies, who
objected sharply not only to the lack of consultation but to what some
viewed as attempts to deceive them..112
Another Middle Eastern incursion by NATO members occurred in 1958,
when the United States and Great Britain landed forces in Lebanon and
Jordan, respectively. They acted at the invitation of those Governments
and in response to a volatile situation sparked by the overthrow of the
Iraqi Government under circumstances that could have led to insurrection
in Lebanon and Jordan. It appears that the United States and the United
Kingdom did consult in the North Atlantic Council before matters came to
a head, warning that they would respond to requests for help in a crisis.
A number of the allies preferred not to become involved, and accordingly
remained silent. Apparently, there was no consultation immediately pre-
ceding the decision to land forces. xla
Decisions were made on decolonization by the European allies without
significant NATO consultation during the most turbulent period of self-
determination, which extended from the granting of independence to India
and Indonesia shortly after World War II through the hostilities in the
ill See Dulles, Developing NATO in Peace, 34 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 706, 709-10
(1956); M. BALL, supra note 63, at 137.
112 Interview with Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59. See F. BEnn, supra note 4, at
13; Brosio, supra note 73, at 115, noting President Eisenhower's outburst at the British-
French conduct.
113 See Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of July 17, 1958, in 6 NATO LEIrTEH,
No. 8, at 10-11 (1958); Luns, supra note 92, at 8-9; F. BEER, supra note 4, at 29;
Jordan & Newman, The Secretary-General of NATO and Multinational Political Leader-
ship, 30 INTL J. (Canada) 732, 754 n.55 (1975).
[Vol. 73
NATO CONSULTATIONS
former Belgian Congo beginning in 1960. That period saw a number of
crises over decolonization for the European states involved, sometimes with
important implications for other members of the alliance. This was true
not only in the Congo, but in such places as Algeria and Indochina as well.
Nevertheless, it took the United Nations involvement in the Congo and the
jockeying for position there by the superpowers to generate any real in-
terest among the allies in being consulted collectively before controversial
decisions about decolonization were made."1
In the 1960's and early 1970's the United States took or threatened mil-
itary action in several situations arising outside the treaty area. In at least
one case the United States attempted to consult but was largely rebuffed;
in some cases it neither attempted nor was expected to consult; and in two
cases it consulted the other allies so hurriedly that there was insufficient
opportunity for input to satisfy them.
The first case grew out of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Although
the Johnson administration insisted that the war was a NATO concern, the
allies preferred not to become involved so long as there was no direct
U.S.-Soviet confrontation." 5 Even when there was a dramatic escalation,
as when the United States sent ground troops into Cambodia, the allies did
not make a serious issue of NATO consultation."16 Other instances in which
the United States neither consulted NATO nor was criticized for the omis-
sion included the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961,117 the intervention in the
Dominican Republic in 1965,11 and the Mayaguez incident in 1975.11'
Despite the possible spillover from all these situations to relations between
the alliance and Eastern Europe, the allies simply regarded them as too re-
mote for concern.
In quite another category were the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the
U.S. worldwide military alert during the 1973 Middle Eastern war. Be-
cause of the element of Soviet-U.S. confrontation, the allies were vitally
concerned. The problem was time.
It would have taken about 10 days from the U.S. discovery of Cuban
launching pads and missile-designed buildings until the missiles could
be on the pads ready for firing. President Kennedy had to consult his
own experts and senior political-military advisers before deciding what
to do, and apparently felt that he could not afford the luxury of seeking
another set of opinions from another set of potential advisers, his partners
114 See A. BuCHAN, -upra note 99, at 24; F. BEER, supra note 4, at 16, 22.
11 See Neff, supra note 20, at 8; R. HI.L, supra note 55, at 89.
11" For an account of the U.S. decisionmaking process regarding the Cambodian
incursion, see M. & B. KALH, KISiNGER 154-64 (1974).
117 See A. BucH.N , NATO D; THE 1960's, at 119 (rev. ed. 1963).
1 See A. BUCHAN, supra note 99, at 34-35.
-" Sc R. HIL, upra note 55, at 71, putting the situation hypothetically but in such
a manner as to suggest that there was no consultation. See also R. RowAN, TiB FOUR
DAYs OF MNAYAGUEZ 66-70, 88-92, 140-44, 172-80 (1975), discussing the U.S. decision-
making without mentioning NATO consultation.
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in NATO. 120 Just before announcing his decision, he sent Dean Acheson
hurriedly to Europe to notify the allies. Although Acheson is reported
to have told General de Gaulle that he was there merely to inform, not
to consult, the then dean of the NATO ambassadorial corps, Belgian Per-
manent Representative Andr6 de Staercke, recalls that Acheson actually
asked him whether the allies had any objection to the U.S. plan. Am-
bassador de Staercke called the NATO Secretary General and told him
they had only a few minutes to decide whether to raise any objections.
They did not, and undoubtedly would not have done so under the circum-
stances even if they had disagreed with the American plan.'' At the
next ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council some questions were
raised regarding consultation in such crises, "but no real complaint was
made against the United States for the manner in which the allies were
consulted or informed." 122
The 1973 worldwide military alert was called in response to a message
from General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon complaining about
alleged Israeli violations of an agreed cease-fire after Israeli forces had
crossed the Suez Canal. Brezhnev's message proposed that the United
States and the Soviet Union urgently dispatch peacekeeping contingents
to Egypt-a proposal the United States had already firmly rejected-and
said that if the United States did not do so, the Soviet Union "should be
faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appro-
priate steps unilaterally. Israel cannot be allowed to get away with the
violations." 123 A hastily assembled group of U.S. governmental experts,
led by Secretary of State Kissinger, concluded that there was a high prob-
ability of some kind of unilateral Soviet move. Informed of this, the
President called the first stage of the worldwide military alert within 2
hours of the receipt of Brezhnev's message. Although Kissinger telephoned
the NATO military commander in Europe, he merely sent a middle-of-
the-night cable to the U.S. political delegation at NATO headquarters in
Brussels, which instructed the delegation to inform the allies. Because
of technical problems in the NATO communications system, the allies
were not actually informed until a few hours later."
24
Ambassador de Staercke, then still dean of the NATO ambassadorial
corps, protested that if the Secretary of State could call the NATO military
commander, he could also have called the NATO Secretary General and
the dean of the ambassadors."25  Other NATO allies made it clear that
they expected such prior consultation as was practicable under the cir-
120See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 99, at 803; A. BucHAN, supra note 99, at 33-34,
41. Nevertheless, the President did consider the effects on NATO of the decisions he
was making. See R. KENNEDY, THMTmEN DAYS 98-99 (1969).
121 Interview with Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59. The exchange between Acheson
and de Gaulle is set forth in E. ABEL, TnE MISSILE Ciusis 112 (1966).
22_ Statement of H. C. Green, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in 3
CANADIAN PARL. DEB., H. C., 25th ParI., 1st Sess. 2699 (1962).
123 Quoted in M. & B. KALB, supra note 116, at 490.
124 Id. at 490-93; interview with Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59.
125 Interview with Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59.
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cumstances, though they recognized that full consultations would not have
been possible-at least if the Soviet threat was as serious as the U.S.
decisionmakers had thought.16 Publicly and privately, the United States
conceded that it had not engaged in adequate consultations at the height
of the crisis and that it would be willing to review its consultative proce-
dures, although it reserved the right to proceed without extensive con-
sultations in an emergency.'2  As a result of the procedural review, the
United States pledged to consult any NATO ally before U.S. forces on
the ally's territory are alerted. 128
Political Developments
Some decisions relating to events outside the treaty area are significant
to the alliance, even though they do not involve immediate crises. To the
extent that they do not, any expectation of prior consultation is weakened.
For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium,
and the Federal Republic of Germany did not consult the smaller NATO
states before deciding to meet in Paris in June 1978 to consider playing
a larger role in Africa following the abortive Shaba invasion earlier that
year1 " However, once they had decided to meet (and had thus taken
the first step toward more active involvement in Zaire and perhaps in all
of Africa), they did discuss their plans at the NATO summit meeting of
May 1978.130 Later that summer, the United States failed to consult its
NATO allies before President Carter decided to invite Egyptian President
Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin to the important Camp David
summit meeting at which a framework for resolving their differences was
worked out. The allies did not expect to be consulted.131
I
6 See Neff, supra note 20, at 7-8; M & B. KmB, supra note 116, at 497. Some
responsible U.S. Government officials assessed the Soviet threat somewhat differently
than did the Secretary of State, and he assessed it differently than did the President.
See M. & B. KALB, supra note 116, at 497-98.
127 Interview with Andr6 de Staercke, supra note 59; M. & B. KALB, supra note
116, at 499; Kissinger, The United States and a Unifying Europe: The Necessity for
Partnership, 69 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 777, 779 (1973); statement of Arthur Hartman,
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, in United States-Europe Relations and
the 1973 Middle East War: Hearings Before the Subcomrns. on Europe and on the
Near East and South Asia of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 31-32, 48-49, 57 (1974). See also R. HILL, supra note 55, at 26-27.
12K Interview with Stephen J. Ledogar, supra note 84.
'12 The Netherlands and Norway were first informed of the impending Paris meeting
at the May NATO summit meeting in Washington. Het Paroql, June 16, 1978 (transla-
tion by U.S. mission to NATO).
130 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, press briefing, May 30, 1978, in DEP'T STATE
BULL., No. 2016, July 1978, at 5.
131 The Carter decision was made immediately after President Sadat announced that
he would not resume direct peace talks with Israel, and involved little or no input even
from President Carter's own foreign policy advisers. See 38 FACTS ON FIE 581, 601-02
(1978); Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1978, at A6, cols. 3-4. The allies expected only
to be informed of developments in Middle East talks. See Atlantic News, July 26, 1978,
at 4.
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In a significant series of decisions focused outside the treaty area, the
NATO allies have made overtures to the People's Republic of China, which
have often led to its being recognized as the Government of China. On
this matter, the consultative practice within NATO has been inconsistent.
Thus, although the Canadian Government at one point thought it was
required to (and did) consult its NATO allies before recognizing the
People's Republic, France did not consult them before extending recog-
nition.13" The United States bypassed NATO on Henry Kissinger's first,
secret trip to Peking. It was taken to task for forgetting its alleged NATO
obligation to consult.133  Nevertheless, when the United States formally
recognized the People's Republic on January 1, 1979, it felt no greater
duty to its NATO allies than to give them prior notification of its intent,
and the allies expected no more.
34
These inconsistencies suggest that there is no NATO norm for prior
consultation relating to politically sensitive acts outside the treaty area,
at least insofar as the acts do not raise the specter of armed confrontation
with the Soviet Union. 135  But when that specter does exist, the allies
expect prior consultation to the extent that it is feasible under the cir-
cumstances. Although the U.S. practice during the Cuban missile crisis
was inconclusive on this point, the assertion-acquiescence processes set
into motion by the 1956 British-French Suez intervention and the 1973
U.S. worldwide military alert support the norm. In both cases the allies
protested what they considered to be inadequate prior consultation, and
the states whose actions precipitated the protests acquiesced by joining
in the ensuing declarations calling for effective prior consultations: the
three wise men's Council-approved report of 1956 and the Declaration on
Atlantic Relations of 1974. The 1956 prescription, in turn, lends normative
significance to the NATO consultations in 1958 on American and British
intentions regarding Lebanon and Jordan.
132 See statements of Paul Martin, Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in
3 CANADIAN PAIL. DEn., H.C., 26th Pail., 2d Sess. 3307, and 4 id. at 3479-80 (1964).
France recognized the People's Republic in 1964, but Canada did not do so until 1970.
133 See Brosio, supra note 73, at 116.
134 Interview with Orme Wilson, supra note 103; R. Hn.L, supra note 46, at 40.
See also Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1978, at A9, col. 1.
35 This may also be true regarding acts closer to home than those discussed in the
text. On a number of occasions the allies let their desire to be disassociated from any
contacts with Franco Spain override any desire they may have had to be consulted be-
fore an individual ally took a step involving Spain. For example, the United States
simply kept its allies informed (that being all they wanted) as it negotiated a friendship
and cooperation treaty with Spain. See statement of Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador
at Large, in Spanish Base Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 9 (1976); Final Communiqu6 of the Defence Planning
Comm., May 23, 1975, para. 5, in NATO FiNAL CoMmuNiQu s 1975, at 11, 12. When
the Federal Republic of Germany explored the possibility of establishing Spanish bases
in 1959, it consulted only the major allies. See G. ListA, supra note 63, at 74-75. The
United Kingdom would not normally consult the allies before drafting a note to Spain
concerning Gibraltar. R. HLL, supra note 55, at 97.
Vol. 73
NATO CONSULTATIONS
It is perhaps debatable whether this record of state practice is sufficient
to establish a binding procedural norm requiring prior consultation when
a NATO ally faces a decision on events outside the treaty area that could
lead to an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union or its allies. The
better view is that the record does establish the duty to consult, insofar
as consultation is feasible under the circumstances. That there are only
a few instances of state practice in this connection reflects the relative
(and happy) paucity of armed confrontations with the Eastern bloc.
When the occasions for state practice are few, and the assertion-acqui-
escence record is both reasonably clear in those few instances and con-
sistent with the shared goals of the only interested states, a special custom
can arise. It probably has arisen in this instance.
VI. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides in part that the allies
"will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies
and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." 136
This does not expressly require prior consultations, but as was noted earlier
in this study, in 1956 the Council approved the three wise men's recom-
mendation that NATO consultations be held whenever economic issues
arise with political or defense implications or with consequences for the
economic health of the Atlantic community as a whole."3' The latter part
of this advice has not always been followed. For example, it was ignored
in August 1971 when the United States imposed an import surcharge of 10
percent and closed the "gold window" backing the U.S. dollar-actions
with obvious consequences for the economic health of the Atlantic com-
munity."", From the first, in fact, attempts to coordinate economic policies
within the alliance have been largely unsuccessful. '"
On the other hand, there is a long record of prior consultation regarding
decisions to supply militarily useful goods or technology to Communist
countries. The consultations do not actually take place in a NATO forum,
but in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), a loosely structured but
security-conscious group based in Paris. COCOM consists of Japan and
all NATO states except Iceland. Formed in 1949, it maintains periodi-
cally changing, unanimously adopted lists of items that member states
normally will not send to Communist countries unless an exception has
been granted by unanimous consent.
The exception procedure amounts to an arrangement for providing prior
consultation rather than formal veto power, because COCOM decisions,
given after confidential discussions in Paris, are recommendatory only.
136 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 3, Art. 2.
137 See text at notes 10-11, supra. The 1974 Declaration on Atlantic Relations, supra
note 14, says that the ales "will work to remove sources of conflict between their
economic policies and to encourage economic co-operation with one another."
13t See Brosio, supra note 73, at 116.
j39 See G. Wright, NATO in the New International Order, 36 BEmM TH HEADLINFS,
No. 4, at 5 (1978).
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Each member retains the power of final decision, although it is very
unusual for a member not to accept a COCOM recommendation.140 It is
also very unusual for a member to try to circumvent COCOM by selling
a listed item to a Communist country without submitting the matter for
discussion in Paris. 1' 1 Consequently, although there is no treaty obligation
to submit any matter to COCOM or to abide by its recommendations,
there appears to be a customary norm among member states to submit
proposed sales of listed items and to give significant-perhaps conclusive-
weight to COCOM's recommendations.
NATO's concern with the environment is expressed through its Com-
mittee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), created in 1969
at the urging of the United States. The primary focus of CCMS is on
pilot environmental studies conducted by individual member states. CCMS
meets twice a year, once to consider the pilot studies and once to conduct
round-table discussions on matters of mutual interest. Although the
round-table discussions have sometimes been occasions for consultation
regarding such proposed measures as the U.S. fluorocarbon ban and air-
craft noise regulations, 14 the year's hiatus between round tables and the
practice of discussing only one issue at each meeting prevent CCMS from
becoming a forum where member states would routinely consult the others




NATO practice establishes that there is an obligatory norm for con-
sultation within the alliance before a member government makes a final
decision on a course of action that (1) could have a direct, adverse effect
on the alliance's collective ability to defend against an attack from out-
side the treaty area, or (2) could significantly enhance the military capa-
bility of those states presumed most likely to attack, i.e., those controlled
140 See Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 50-51, 61 (1976); Extension of the Export
Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 174-75
(1976).
141 One instance in which there may have been circumvention was the license granted
in 1975 by Rolls Royce to the People's Republic of China for the manufacture of Spey
jet engines. The license may have substantially accelerated the development of Chinese
propulsion design and production technology, according to a CIA statement in House
Hearings, supra note 140, pt. 2, at 8 (1976). The proposed deal had been submitted
to COCOM in 1973, but had been withdrawn after some members expressed reserva-
tions. It was not resubmitted, but the United Kingdom did consult at least some of the
allies bilaterally. See Rolls-Royce Deal: Its Political and Military Meaning, excerpted
from BusiNEss CHINA, Feb. 6, 1976, in id. at 26-27; Financial Times, Dec. 23, 1975, at
4, col. 5.
142 Interview with James Sampas, CCMS Project Officer, July 5, 1978.
143On the limitations of CCMS, see Kyba, Environmental Co-operation To Meet
Political Objectives, INTERNAnoNAr PERSPECTIVES, July-Aug. 1977, at 11.
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by Communist governments. These two cases, of course, are opposite
sides of the same coin.
This norm is supported not only by the implied duty of parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty to consult before denouncing the treaty, but by the
regular defense budget consultative procedure, the consultative procedure
stipulated by the Council in 1955 for extraordinary force reductions, the
U.S. practice of consulting before appointing SACEUR, and the evolving
practice of consulting before undertaking arms control negotiations that
are particularly likely to affect means of defense relied upon by the Euro-
pean allies. As for the other side of the coin, the well-established COCOM
procedure supports the norm.
There are some limitations. The norm does not require consultations
before an initial decision is made, even if the decision establishes a general
course of action that is irreversible for all practical purposes. An example
would be the decisions by several allies to reduce their forces assigned to
NATO. The duty arises, in other words, only before a final decision is
made that establishes the particulars of what is to be done. Even that
norm does not extend to decisions to take an action that could weaken
the ability of an individual ally to participate in the common defense.
Those decisions usually are made in an atmosphere of such tension be-
tween the allies directly involved that consultations within the alliance
have not occurred and could not reasonably be expected.
A second obligatory norm requires such NATO consultations as are
feasible when an ally contemplates action within or outside the treaty
area that could lead, in the short run, to armed confrontation with the
Soviet Union or could seriously exacerbate an existing confrontation with
it. Support for this norm is found in the treaty's implied duty to consult
before countering a threat to the territory, independence, or security of
any party; it is also found in the NATO procedure on the use of tactical
nuclear weapons, as well as in the assertions and acquiescences when
individual allies have acted in crises, particularly in the Middle East.
Consultations that could cripple decisionmaking in a crisis are not
required. Nevertheless, as the allied response to the 1973 worldwide alert
shows, the duty is not excused merely because the acting state perceives
a need for a quick decision. Nor is the duty, as it applies to confrontation
situations, simply a duty to consult after an initial decision but before a
final one. The expectation is that the allies will be taken into the basic
decisionmaking process insofar as is practicable under the prevailing
circumstances.
There have been a number of nonconfrontation situations outside the
treat, area, in which the decisions of individual allies could have affected
the interests of others. Sometimes there have been prior consultations in
these cases, but not with such consistency as to establish an obligation.
This study has shown that normative expectations have arisen in the
alliance beyond the narrow ones found strictly in the North Atlantic
Treaty. The expectations have arisen partly from provisions in the treaty
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itself and partly from Council declarations and statements by NATO
Secretaries General and U.S. Presidents, but also from less formal practice.
As a result, prior consultations are required in the two categories discussed
above. But this study has also shown that, despite the sweeping language
sometimes found in the declarations and statements, there is no all-encom-
passing duty to consult whenever an individual government's decision
might affect the interests of its NATO allies. The political-military alliance
has not yet reached that stage of shared decisionmaking.
